Motivated by the EU concept of Pre-Commercial Procurement and the massive presence of SMEs in the European economy, we study how budget constraints affect R&D effort in sequential elimination tournaments. We show that introducing budget constraints leads to a non-monotonicity in unconstrained contestants' effort.
Introduction
In this paper we study how asymmetric budget constraints affect firm behavior in sequential elimination tournaments. The research is motivated by a new concept called Pre-Commercial Procurement (PCP) that has been introduced in the European Union to stimulate innovation through public procurement.
1
PCP concerns the R&D phase of an innovation and is a new approach compared to standard auction-like practices of public procurement. An important feature of PCP is that it is organised as a competitive stepwise process. In PCP a number of firms enter the competition and start developing alternative solutions. At the end of each phase, intermediate evaluations are conducted, which form the basis for the sequential elimination of participating firms. This makes it suitable to model the procurement process as a sequential contest game or elimination contest.
Importantly, we take into account asymmetries across firms. Paradoxically, EU public procurement is mostly undertaken by big firms 2 , whereas the large majority of all businesses in the EU are small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) 3 . Moreover, SMEs are in many cases thought to contribute importantly to innovation activities and growth 4 .
This raises a very natural question of what might happen in PCP when big firms that are typically present in public contracting compete against small firms that are desirable to involve in such innovative environments. An important feature of SMEs is their limited access to finance and, thus, their budget constraints. 5 In PCP, stimulating participation among these firms will inevitably lead them to compete against bigger and less constrained firms.
6
The analysis in this paper is motivated by our desire to understand incentives for financially asymmetric firms to exert R&D effort in PCP-like contests. We explicitly take into account this characteristic of SMEs and show that a two-stage contest where all 1 See European Commission (2007), Pre-commercial Procurement:
Driving Innovation to Ensure Sustainable High Quality Public Services in Europe, http://ec.europa.eu/invest-inresearch/pdf/download en/com 2007 799.pdf.
2 Between 2009 and 2011, only 29% of the value of EU public procurement went to small and mediumsized enterprises (European Commission, 2014) .
3 99,8% of all EU registered firms are SMEs and they produce more than a half of European GDP (European Commission, 2014) .
4 SMEs being a driver of innovation and growth goes, at least, back to Schumpeter (1910 Schumpeter ( , 1943 and is one of the important arguments behind the US Small Business Act and the Small Business Act of Europe. See Rothwell (1989) for an introduction to the topic.
5 See Abraham and Schmukler (2017) and references therein. 6 See Arve (2014) for an analysis of the interaction between financially constrained and unconstrained firms in traditional public procurement.
1 contestants compete against each other at each stage and where only a limited number of contestants are accepted to the next stage gives increasing incentives to exert effort over time.
Our model also suggests that the asymmetry between budget-constrained and unconstrained contestants fundamentally changes competition within the contest. Introducing budget constraints mechanically limits the ability to invest in effort and R&D. But, more importantly, it leads to a non-monotonicity in the unconstrained firms' first-stage effort. For very tight budgets, the weakness of the budget-constrained contestants lowers the incentives of the unconstrained contestants to exert effort relative to an environment with no budget-constraints. However, there always exists an interval of values for the budget constraints, which we can think of as moderate and minor budget constraints, for which the unconstrained firms exert higher effort than when faced with unconstrained contestants only.
In our model we abstract away from some firms (for instance SMEs) being better at innovation or R&D and simply assume that everyone has the same ex ante ability to win the innovation contest. Allowing SMEs to have a higher ability to come up with original ideas would only strengthen our result of increased effort in contests that include such firms.
In fact the driver of our result is the following: When exerting effort in the first stage, the unconstrained contestants not only influence their likelihood of making it to the final stage, but also whom to face in the final stage. Because the expected payoff of an unconstrained contestant is decreasing in the budget-constrained firm's potential to exert effort in the final stage, we obtain a non-monotonicity in the unconstrained contestants effort. This effect is present regardless of whether we allow for spillover effects across stages or not. Spillovers is a natural assumption in an innovation environment, including PCP. However, the fact that the result is not driven by them broadens the scope of our result to more general contest environments.
Through our non-monotonicity result we differ from previous results in the contest theory literature that suggest that even contests stimulate effort more than uneven contests. In their seminal paper on rank-order tournaments, Lazear and Rosen (1981) argue that contests with asymmetric types are inefficient and suggest a handicap scheme to level the playing field between heterogeneous contests. Clark and Riis (2000) obtain a similar result in a bribe tournament. In a one-stage Tullock (1980) contest, Baik (1994) shows that both individual and total effort is maximised in an even contest.
PCP has not yet received a lot of attention in the economic literature. One exception is Che et al (2015) who investigate the extent to which the pure unbundling between R&D and commercial phases of procurement, as it is called for in PCP, can be justified on contract-theoretical grounds. Our model is very different in that it assumes that PCP is the selection method and investigates how effort in this tender competition is affected by the characteristics of the contestants. Furthermore, in the contest literature, we build on Clark and Riis (1996) and Fu and Lu (2012) , who consider an all-against-all contest, and extend their analysis to also include a final stage with only one winner.
7 In fact, most papers on multi-stage contests (for instance Rosen (1986) , Gradstein (1998) , Gradstein and Konrad (1999) , Amegashie (1999) , Amegashie (2000) , Baik and Lee (2000) , Stein and Rapoport (2005) and Moldovanu and Sela (2006) ) focus on situations in which at each stage, subgroups of contestants compete to become the unique group winner. In some settings such as sport tournaments this is of course a more appropriate assumption, but in PCP all firms compete against all other firms at each stage making an all-against-all contest more appropriate. Budget constraints in contest environments have been studied by Che and Gale (1997) , Che and Gale (1998) and Gavious et al (2002) in one stage contests and by Stein and Rapoport (2005) , Amegashie (2004) , Harbaugh and Klumpp (2005) and Ghosh and Stong (2018) in a two-stage contest where at the first stage there are two or more groups and there is only one winner within each group. 8 We extend this literature to also consider two-stage contests with all-against-all contests at each stage. There is also a literature that looks at contests and all-pay auctions with head starts. The closest paper to ours in Cohen et al (2016) who study the optimal head start in two-stage elimination contests. In a related paper Klein and Schmutzler (2017) study optimal head starts (vs prizes) in two-stage rank-order tournaments. Neither of these papers consider budget constraints. Furthermore, they model spillovers as the first-stage effort directly affecting the outcome of the second stage, regardless of what that firststage effort actually lead to. We think of spillovers as a fixed advantage coming from having generated the best concept in the first stage and model the phenomenon as in Franke et al (2018) . This way of modeling spillovers is close to models of all-pay auctions 7 Formally, they consider a contest in which effort is chosen once and for all, but the losers at each of the first K stages continue to compete. The winners of the contest are all the winners of the different stages where previous winners have been sequentially eliminated. In our model, this is how we model the contest within each stage.
8 Klumpp and Polborn (2006) and Sela and Erez (2013) consider the role of budget constraints in sequential contests with a different structure, namely where the two same players compete against each other over several stages.
where the score of each firm includes both the effort and potential head start or other heterogeneities across contestants (see for instance, Kovenock and Roberson (2009) and Clark and Nilssen (2017) ) and it is also similar to contest models with homogeneous spillovers or noise (Dasgupta and Nti, 1998; Amegashie, 2006; Myerson and Wärneryd, 2006) .
9
In our model environment, we consider that the spillovers are exogenous. As they measure the benefits from having offered the best concept in the first-stage, they cannot be considered as an instrument that the contest designer can choose. This is in contrast to a small literature that looks at the optimal choice for head starts (Kirkekgaard, 2012; Seel and Wasser, 2014) . Relatedly, Konrad (2002) considers a contest where participants can spend resources at earlier stages to increase the value of the prize. We touch upon this topic in Section 5.3.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: The model as well as benchmark results in the case of no budget constraints are presented in Section 2. Our main results in the case with both budget-constrained and unconstrained contestants are presented in Section 3. In Section 4 we extend our model to allow for spillovers across periods. Section 5 discusses extensions of our model to different pools of contestants, observability of contestants' type as well as some design issues.
The model
We consider a two-stage elimination contest with 3 contestants. Players are risk neutral and can exert costly effort to influence their probability of winning the contest. We use a standard Tullock contest function (Tullock, 1980) to model the probability of winning a stage contest. Effort at stage t by contestant i is denoted x ti , where t ∈ {1, 2} and i ∈ {1, 2, 3}. The winner of the contest is the winner of the final stage. This contestant obtains a prize of value v.
In the first stage, contestants exert effort levels to become one of two finalists who continue to the second stage of the contest. We follow Clark and Riis (1996) and Fu and Lu (2012) and assume that the probability of becoming a finalist equals the probability of coming first or second in the first-stage contest. We can therefore defineq ij as the 9 An alternative way of modeling spillovers is to assume that the level of first-stage effort directly influences the second-stage win probability as in Baye et al. (2012) and Baik and Lee (2000) or the cost of exerting effort in the second stage, as in Clark and Nilssen (2013) and Clark et al (2012) . However, for our purpose we feel that modeling spillovers as a fixed advantage from generating the best solution in the first-stage captures important features of PCP.
probability of contestants i and j continuing to the final and q 1i as the probability that contestant i makes it to the final (regardless of the identity of his opponent in the final).
Given a vector of first-period effort levels (x 11 , x 12 , x 13 ), the probability that contestants 1 and 2 make it to the final,q 12 , is defined as q 12 (x 11 , x 12 , x 13 ) = x 11 (x 11 + x 12 + x 13 )
Prob. that 1 is ranked first and 2 is ranked second + x 12 (x 11 + x 12 + x 13 )
Prob. that 2 is ranked first and 1 is ranked second
The formulas for other contestants are symmetrically defined so that the probability that contestants i and j make it to the final,q ij , is
Given first-period efforts (x 11 , x 12 , x 13 ), contestant 1's probability of making it to the final, q 11 , is the sum ofq 12 andq 13 . This can be rewritten as q 11 (x 11 , x 12 , x 13 ) = 
Again, the formulas for the other contestants are symmetrically defined so that the probability of contestant i continuing to the second stage, q 1i can be written as
For notational simplicity we sometimes write (x 11 , x 12 , x 13 ) as (x 1i , x 1−i ). In the second, and final, stage, the two finalists compete to win the prize v. In PCP, the tender for the R&D contract is separated from the tender for the commercialization of the innovative product. Thus, the contest is for the value of the R&D contract, not the firm specific value of the innovation itself. Given the two finalists, i and j, and their effort levels, (x 2i , x 2j ), the probability of i winning is equal to
In the baseline model we ignore spillovers across periods. This is merely for expositional reasons since winning the first round in an innovation contest probably means that that contestant has a better idea or design and this should increase his chance of winning the entire contest. We account for this more realistic assumption in Section 4 and show that our results from the baseline model straightforwardly carry over to the setting with spillovers.
The solution concept is subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. Szidarovszky and Okuguchi (1997) ensures that we have existence of a unique equilibrium under these assumptions.
Benchmark without budget constraints
Without any budget concerns, in the final stage, the two finalists choose effort levels that solve max
The equilibrium effort level for each finalist is
. This is in fact the well-known n-player Tullock contest formula for a prize equal to v.
10 This yields a second-period expected payoff of Π no = v 4 . Compared to a one-stage contest (where equilibrium effort would be equal to 2 9 v), the two-stage mechanism gives the finalists greater incentives to exert effort. This is a direct consequence of the well-known result in Tullock contests which says that the higher the number of contestants the lower the individual effort.
Given this equilibrium behaviour, each contestant i chooses first-period effort that solves max
Straightforward computations of first-order conditions yield an equilibrium level of firststage effort x . Since there are two ways of "winning" the first stage (coming first or second in the first stage), the standard n-player Tullock contest formula mentioned previously does not apply. Clark and Riis (1996) provides a generalisation of this formula to the many-prize setting.
11 This formula applies in our setting where the prizes for 10 The general n-player formula is x = n−1 n 2 v. 11 The general n-contestant-k-prize formula in Clark and Riis (1996) is x = 6 coming first or second in the first-stage is Π no , the expected payoff from the second stage.
The individual first-stage effort is higher than the effort had there only been one firstperiod prize of value Π no , but it is lower than the total effort from two contests each with a single prize of Π no . This is a direct consequence of there being two ways of "winning" the first stage in our setting.
3 Two-stage contest with both budget-constrained and unconstrained contestants
To illustrate how asymmetric budget constraints influence contestants' incentives to choose effort x ti , we limit the analysis to the case where one contestant's budget-constraint is indeed a relevant concern. 12 The case of two budget-constrained contestants is provided as an extension in Section 5.1 but does not qualitatively alter the results. To focus on the interesting case of a binding budget constraint, we assume in the following that the budget is less than the sum of total equilibrium effort when there are no budget constraint.
Assumption 1. Contestants 1 and 2 face no budgetary restrictions whereas contestant 3's total budget, w 3 , satisfies
This assumption implies that contestant 3 cannot choose first-period effort equal to x . For completeness, we provide the solution to the alternative benchmark, in which all contestants are budget-constrained in Appendix B. However, this is less relevant for the analysis of settings in which SMEs are introduced into PCP contests where they will face larger firms.
Second stage: The equilibrium outcome of the final stage now depends on the identity of the finalists and on their budgets. If the two finalists are contestants 1 and 2, then the second-period effort is the same as in the benchmark, i.e., the symmetric second-stage effort is x 2,ij = v 4
. However, if contestant 3 is one of the finalists, he can only exert effort
, where V (k) is a contestant's valuation of winning one of the k prizes. 12 As much as possible we use the notation x ti for effort of contestant i in period t. Whenever it is necessary to clarify who the other contestant (in the second period) is, we extend the notation to x 2,ij . 7 up to the level min{w 3 − x 13 , v 4 }. The following observation will be useful to obtain our results.
Lemma 1. Contestant 3 will always be (weakly) budget constrained in the second stage, i.e.,
Lemma 1 establishes that the budget constraint binds in the second period. This is a straightforward proof by contradiction. If this does not hold, then contestant 3 should spend more in the first-stage contest as this would increase his expected payoff and could still choose the first-best level of effort in the second stage. Using this observation, we can apply results from Che and Gale (1997) that shows that, in this budget-constrained case, it is indeed optimal for contestant 3 to spend his entire remaining budget in the final stage.
Lemma 2. (Che and Gale (1997) , Section 3.2) When contestant 3 is budget constrained in the final stage, it is optimal for him to spend his entire budget:
Contestant 3 would like to spend
in the final stage, but does not have enough budget. He therefore chooses to spend as much as he can to get as close as possible to this optimal, but unattainable, level of effort. Importantly, this constraint on x 23 has an effect on the other finalist's choice of effort; their optimal response is given by the first-order condition associated with (7) but where x 23 = w 3 − x 13 . Thus, the optimal level of effort for an unconstrained contestant facing a budget-constrained contestant is
. The unconstrained contestant optimally bids less against the weaker contestant than against an equal competitor. Furthermore, to increase his probability of winning, an unconstrained contestant spends more than his constrained counterpart (x 2,i3 > x 23 ) and the larger the budget of the constrained contestant, the more effort is exerted in the second-stage, by both contestants. Contestant 3's expected payoff when entering the final stage is
When facing contestant 3 in the final stage, unconstrained contestant i's expected second-8 period payoff is:
Otherwise, it is Π no = v 4 . The three levels of expected payoff in the final stage can be ordered as follows.
Lemma 3. For all x 13 ∈ (0, w 3 ),
Contestant 3 is limited in his expenditures and can never earn as much as he could without this constraint. This gives us the first inequality. For an unconstrained contestant, facing a budget-constrained contestant weakens competition and, consequently, leads to higher expected payoffs than when facing an equal competitor.
First stage: Contestant 3 chooses first-period effort x 13 that solves max
His best-response to contestants 1 and 2's symmetric 14 strategy x 1i is characterized in the following lemma.
Lemma 4. Contestant 3's optimisation problem is concave and his best response x 13 to the other contestants' (symmetric) strategy
Contestant 3's best response equalises the marginal benefit from the first-stage effort to the marginal cost of exerting such effort. The marginal benefit is the (marginal) increase in expected payoff from a higher probability of winning. There are two costs associated with effort in the first stage. It involves the actual cost of effort, but it also affects the expected payoff in the final stage. A marginal increase in first-stage effort reduces the final-stage effort because of the budget constraint. Less effort in the final stage is associated with a lower expected payoff.
For contestant i ∈ {1, 2}, the expected final-stage payoff depends on the identity of the other finalist. With our notationq ij for the probability that i and j make it to the final, the first stage problem becomes:
Lemma 5. Contestant i's optimisation problem is concave and his best response solves
For each unconstrained contestant, the associated first-order condition also balances the marginal cost and benefit from effort. In this case, notice that the expected secondstage payoff depends on the identity of the second finalist. As pointed out in Lemma 3, facing a constrained finalist yields a higher expected second-period payoff. This observation allows us to show that first-stage equilibrium effort is higher for the unconstrained contestants than for contestant 3. Proposition 1. The unique equilibrium levels of effort, (x * 1i , x * 13 ), solve (16) and (18) and are such that
The constrained contestant always exerts less effort than his unconstrained counterparts. This is because he has a limited budget and must stay within it. The two unconstrained contestants can exert more effort in order to improve their chances of getting to the final. This is illustrated in Figure 1 .
Figure 1 also suggests a less straightforward result: first-stage effort by unconstrained contestants is not monotone in the strength of the weak contestant (as measured by w 3 ). The remainder of this section formally proves this non-monotonicity and shows that changes to the budget constraint, w 3 , has two opposing effects on the first-stage effort by unconstrained contestants.
Proposition 2. The effect of an increase in the constrained contestant's budget w 3 on Figure 1 : First-stage effort as a function of w 3 (x 1i in blue, x 13 in red and x sym in yellow) for v = 10.
the unconstrained contestants' effort can be decomposed a follows:
• A competition effect: ∂x 1i ∂x 13 ≥ 0, and ∂x 13 ∂w 3 ≥ 0.
An increase in w 3 increases the best response x 13 , which in equilibrium increases x 1i .
• A payoff effect:
An increase in w 3 decreases the best response x 1i .
The intuition for Proposition 2 is as follows. First, when w 3 increases, as a response to a more competitive contestant 3, the unconstrained contestants increase their first-stage effort in order to ensure a high enough probability of making it to the final stage. This is the competition effect. In fact, when w 3 is close to zero, the unconstrained bidders need to exert very little effort to reach the final since competition from the constrained contestant is virtually non-existing. As the budget w 3 increases, more effort needs to be exerted as a response to competition. This can be seen in Figure 1 where first-stage effort is increasing for small enough w 3 .
However, the first-stage effort also depends on whom they face in the final. This is because expected payoff in the final stage depends on the identity of the finalists. For the unconstrained contestant, the expected payoff when facing a budget-constrained contestant is decreasing in w 3 . This means that as the budget w 3 increases the expected gains in the final stage decreases, thus making it less attractive to exert effort. This is the payoff effect. As suggested in Figure 1 , for high enough values of w 3 the payoff effect is sufficiently negative so that first-stage effort x 1i is decreasing in w 3 .
The following two corollaries confirm the result in Figure 1 and show that both effects are always relevant and may dominate for some values of w 3 . Corollary 1. The competition effect dominates for small enough values of w 3 :
When contestant 3 has a very small budget, the expected payoff from facing this contestant in a final is very high. The decrease in expected payoff from a small increase in contestant 3's budget is negligible. An unconstrained contestant will increase his effort as w 3 increases so as to optimise his chance of making it to the final stage of the contest.
Corollary 2. The payoff effect dominates for high enough values of w 3 :
For high enough values of w 3 , the expected payoff from facing a budget-constrained contestant in a final is not very different from the expected payoff from facing an equal competitor. It becomes less attractive to exert effort as the gains from facing a disadvantaged contestant decreases. Therefore x 1i decreases in w 3 for high enough values of w 3 .
These two corollaries taken together establish the non-monotonicity of x 1i in w 3 .
Corollary 3. x * 1i is non-monotone in w 3 .
This corollary suggests that when first-period effort is important for the contest designer, an interior value of the budget constraint may be preferable to no budget constraints as it gives unconstrained contestants an extra incentive via the larger gains they can expect when facing a weaker finalist. This, along with other design issues, are discussed in Section 5.3.
Spillovers between stages
In the previous section we provided results in the case where effort at one stage of the contest does not influence the outcome of other stages of the contest. However, in an innovation contest like PCP this might seem very restrictive and, perhaps, it is more reasonable to assume the winner of the initial stage has an advantage in terms of the idea or design that this contestant has produced and his chances of winning the entire contest has therefore increased. In this section we account for this more realistic assumption and show that our results from the baseline model straightforwardly carry over to the setting with spillovers.
In this section we follow Franke et al (2018) and assume that winning the first stage increases the winner's probability of winning the second stage 15 :
This definition of winning probabilities implies that for given (x 2i , x 2j ), winning the first stage increases the winner's probability of winning the second stage relative to the benchmark case with no spillovers (q h 2i (x 2i , x 2j ) > q 2i (x 2i , x 2j )), while losing the first stage, reduces it (q nh 2i (x 2i , x 2j ) < q 2i (x 2i , x 2j )).
16 For the second-stage effort to still have some influence on the outcome of the contest we impose the following restriction on h:
In the benchmark case without budget-constraints it is straightforward to show that effort levels in the final stage are:
In the second stage, both contestants equalise marginal benefit from exerting effort to marginal cost. However, due to the first-stage winner enjoying a head start, this contestant 15 This way of modeling a head start is also very close to how a head start is modeled in all-pay auctions. For instance Kovenock and Roberson (2009) and Clark and Nilssen (2017) assume that the win probability in an all-pay auction depends on the comparison between effort levels and head start h in the following way:
16 The former is true as
The latter is straightforward. 17 With this assumption we rule out the uninteresting case where x 2 is optimally set to zero.
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does not need to exert as much effort. These effort levels are associated with the following expected second-period payoffs
+ h if i is the first-stage winner,
if not.
The lower optimal effort level for the contestant with the head start implies that he enjoys a higher second-period payoff, both relative to the contestant with no head start and relative to the benchmark with no spillovers (while the equilibrium probability of winning is the same in the three cases and equal to 1/2).
In the first stage without any budget constraints, we can also show that the possibility of obtaining a head start in the final gives contestants incentives to exert higher effort in the initial stage. Namely,
As winning the first contest gives the contestant an advantage in the second-stage competition which results in an extra payoff, the contestants are willing to exert an extra effort in the first stage, relative to the benchmark case (where x ). When contestant 3 faces a budget constraint, the same reasoning as in the previous section applies, but we have to take into account which contestant got a head start. Analogously to the case with no spillovers, we adopt the following assumption which ensures that h is small enough for the budget constraint in the final stage to always be an issue: Assumption 3.
The following lemma summarizes final-stage strategies x 2j .
Lemma 6. Second-stage strategies depend on the identity of the finalist and who has a head start. These strategies are summarized as follows:
• For the constrained contestant,
• For an unconstrained contestant i ∈ {1, 2},
-facing the other unconstrained contestant:
− h if i is the first-stage winner,
-facing the constrained contestant:
Contestant 3 is budget constrained and can therefore not choose his optimal level of effort. He therefore chooses the highest admissible effort level given the budget constraint (which is the same regardless of whether he has a head start or not). As in the case without budget constraints, an unconstrained contestant with the head start optimally exerts a lower level of effort. It can be shown that, for a given x 13 , when a contestant has the head start the optimal level of effort is lower relative to the benchmark case, while if he does not have the head start his optimal effort is higher: x h 2,i3 < x 2,i3 < x nh 2,i3 .
18
Also, analogously to the benchmark with no spillovers, it holds that x h 2,i3 < x h 2,ij and x nh 2,i3 < x nh 2,ij . These second-stage strategies give rise to the following expected second-stage payoffs:
• For the constrained contestant:
18 The first inequality is straightforward and the latter is true as
It is straightforward to check that a contestant's expected payoff against a given opponent is always higher when the contestant in question has a head start. This result is obvious since a head start in an innovation contest is always beneficial. Despite exerting the same effort regardless whether he has the head start or not, the constrained contestant has a higher chance of winning in case of a head start, which results in a higher expected payoff relative to the benchmark with no spillovers: Π (where Π i3 (w 3 − x 13 ) is defined by (13)).
19
The following lemma extends the comparison of expected payoffs along the same lines as Lemma 3.
Lemma 7. For all x 13 ∈ (0, w 3 ), expected payoffs can be ordered as follows:
and
In terms of expected payoff, a contestant with a head start has the highest payoff if he is unconstrained and faces a constrained contestant. But a favored contestant facing an equal contestant also has a higher expected payoff than a favored constrained contestant. The same payoff ranking holds for the unfavored contestant.
These rankings of expected payoffs, along with the best responses from the first stage give us the equivalent to Proposition 1 in the presence of spillovers. 
19 The latter inequality is true as
Furthermore, in the presence of spillovers we can still decompose the effect of changes in the constrained contestant's budget as in the model without spillover and the signs of the effects remain unchanged.
Proposition 4. In the presence of spillovers in the form of a head start to the winner of the first stage, the effect of an increase in the constrained contestant's budget w 3 on the unconstrained competitors' effort can still be decomposed as follows:
• A competition effect: ∂x 1i ∂x 13 ≥ 0, and
An increase in w 3 decreases the best response x 1i , An increase in the budget of the constrained contestant on the one hand raises the optimal effort of the unconstrained contestant as a response to the increase in competitiveness of the latter (competition effect). On the other hand it lowers the optimal effort since the expected payoff of competing against the constrained in the second stage (which depends negatively on w 3 ) is lower (payoff effect).
Also, we can show that the following result holds:
Proposition 5. The optimal first-stage effort of both constrained and unconstrained contestants is higher than in the case with no spillovers
17 5 Discussion
Two budget-constrained contestants
To show that the results in the main model do not depend on just having one budgetconstrained firm, we now focus on the case where two players are (symmetrically) budget constrained, such that w 2 = w 3 = w. Again, to focus on the interesting case of binding budget constraints we assume that w satisfies Assumption 1. Second stage: The equilibrium outcome of the final stage again depends on the identity of the finalists and on their budgets. If the two finalists are 2 and 3, their second period effort would be their remaining budget, as in the benchmark with symmetric budgets i.e., x 2i = w −x 1i , i = 2, 3 (See Appendix B). On the other hand, if the unconstrained player 1 is one of the finalists, he will optimally exert effort as in Section 3:
Second-period expected payoffs are therefore as follows:
• if the unconstrained contestant 1 enters the final stage and faces contestant i with remaining budget w − x 1i , his expected payoff is (the same as in (13))
where i = 2, 3.
Notice that because contestant 1 is not budget constrained, his second-period payoff does not directly depend on his first-period choice of effort.
• if constrained contestant i = 2, 3 enters the final stage, his expected payoff is
For notational reasons we define
The ranking of expected payoff levels in the final stage is stated in the following lemma
Lemma 8. For all x 1i ∈ (0, w),
Intuitively, a constrained contestant expects a larger second-period payoff from competing against another constrained player than against an unconstrained one. This gives the first inequality. An unconstrained contestant gets a higher expected payoff than an unconstrained competitor regardless of competition.
First stage: Turning to the first stage of the contest, we focus on the case where the two constrained contestants play symmetric equilibrium strategies.
20
Contestant 1 chooses first-period effort x 11 to maximize 21 :
The following lemma characterizes his best response against contestants 2 and 3' symmetric strategy x 1i : Lemma 9. Contestant 1's best response, x 11 , solves
Again, the unconstrained contestant's optimal effort equalises the marginal cost of effort and the marginal benefit of effort in terms of increased probability of making it to the final stage.
Simultaneously, for i, j = {2, 3}, j = i, constrained contestant i chooses effort x 1i to solve:
subject to x 1i ≤ w.
(50)
The symmetric best response of constrained contestants 2 and 3 to unconstrained contestant 1 is characterized in the following lemma.
Lemma 10. Contestants 2 and 3's best response, x 1i , solves
The interpretation is analogous to the one of Lemma 4, namely the best response of the constrained contestants equalises the marginal benefit of an increase of effort, in terms of increased probability of winning (left-hand side) and its marginal cost, in terms of actual cost (first term on the right-hand side) plus decrease in the expected payoff of the second stage due to spending a lower effort in the second stage (second term on the right-hand side).
The additional effect in Lemma 10 complicates calculations of the equilibrium, but as can be seen from the illustration in the following figure, equilibrium effort in the first stage of the contest is similar to the case of one budget-constrained contestant and two unconstrained contestants. As before, a contestant without a budget constraint can clearly exert more first-stage effort and increase, his chances of making it to the final stage. With only one unconstrained contestant, there is no incentive to choose your fellow-finalist as both other contestants are symmetric and budget-constrained. However, as the budget of these contestants increase the unconstrained contestant still decreases his first-stage effort. This is now solely to give the budget-constrained contestants incentives to exert more effort in the first stage and thus become less fierce in the second stage.
In a more general framework with a larger number of contestants, we would have all the effects described in this section as well as different levels of second-period payoff depending on the type of the finalists as in Lemma 5. However, this extension is beyond the scope of this paper and does not add something fundamentally new to our main insights.
Non-observability of finalist identity
In our baseline model, the identities of the finalists are common knowledge. That implies that each contestant in the final knows the type (budget-constrained or not) of his competitor and can fine-tune his second-period strategy to this information. That is why the second-stage effort by an unconstrained bidder is higher when facing an equal contestant compared to when he faces a budget-constrained finalist. This is in line with the Principle of Transparency in European public procurement. From a theoretical perspective, it is nevertheless interesting to study how incentives to exert effort change when the identity of the finalists is not common knowledge.
For a budget-constrained finalist, nothing changes as he knows that he faces one of the two unconstrained contestants and with a limited budget it will still be optimal to spend it all. The following proposition compares the optimal strategy of an unconstrained contestant who does not know whether he faces another unconstrained, and thus equal, contestant or a weak, budget-constrained contestant.
Proposition 6. When the identity of the finalists remains secret, an unconstrained finalist chooses effort x u 2 between the levels of effort he would have chosen had he known the identity of his competitor:
Since an unconstrained finalist takes into account the probability of the type of the other finalist, his best-response lies between the strategy he would choose when facing an equal finalist for sure and the one chosen when facing a budget-constrained finalist for sure. The exact level of this second-stage effort, depends on the beliefs about the identity of the competitor. This in turn depends on effort in the first-stage as they determine the likelihood of each contestant making it to the final stage.
Turning to expected second-stage payoffs, we get a similar ranking as in the previous cases. The constrained contestant cannot expect to gain as much as had he been unconstrained and the constrained contestant makes more than had he faced an equally constrained contestant.
Lemma 11. Denote the expected second-stage payoff of a budget-constrained contestant Π 3 and the expected second-stage payoff of an unconstrained contestantΠ i . These expected payoffs can be ranked in the following way:
In the first stage of the contest, the budget-constrained contestant still solves the same maximization problem as in the baseline model where finalists' types are observable, except that expected payoff from the final is lower since the other finalist exerts more effort.
However, the first-stage choice of effort for the unconstrained bidders gets more complicated. The expected second-stage payoff now depends on the beliefs about the type of the other finalist. The first-order condition does not simply equalise the marginal change in probability of winning multiplied by the expected second-stage payoff to marginal cost. It also takes into account how a change in first-stage effort changes the beliefs about the other finalist and thus second-stage expected payoff.
Design issues
While an in-depth analysis of design issues is beyond the scope of this paper, in this section we provide some illustrations that the design of PCP presented in our model (i.e., two stages, final prize only and asymmetric contestants) may perform well for some objectives of the principal.
We start by showing that the presence of a budget-constrained contestant may induce higher total effort in the first stage of the contest relative to the symmetric case with no constraints. As it is possible to see in Figure 3 , provided the budget asymmetry is not too large (i.e., w 3 is high enough) total first-stage effort is larger in the asymmetric contest. This is the case because for w 3 high enough, the two unconstrained contestants' additional effort (relative to the symmetric case) more than compensates for contestant 3's reduced effort (see Figure 4 for the difference between individual effort in our main model and the benchmark). The illustration suggests that if the principal is concerned with the total first-stage effort, then small budget constraints is in fact not a concern, but rather beneficial. Second, we show that the expected level of total effort for the unconstrained player is higher relative to the symmetric case. As shown in Figure 5 the unconstrained player exerts an overall larger expected effort in the asymmetric case than in the symmetric case. This is mainly because expected second-stage effort is higher in the asymmetric case relative to the symmetric case. Although the actual level of effort in the asymmetric case is lower or equal to the one in the symmetric case, the likelihood of making it to the second stage is much higher. For w 3 high enough, the first-stage effort is also higher. However this level of effort is much smaller than the second-stage level 22 and the lower level of first-stage effort for low w 3 does not outweigh the positive effect of the increased expected second-stage effort. This result suggests that a principal who expects the unconstrained contestants to win and therefore cares about their expected effort throughout the contest should not be worried about introducing weaker contestants and thus making the contest asymmetric. The principal could of course have other objectives, including minimizing costly duplication of effort. Our main point is to show that introducing asymmetries into an all-against-all elimination contest has a non-monotone effect on effort and provide some casual evidence that this might also be beneficial to the principal. A deeper discussion of the design issues and what the principal's objective is, or should be, is beyond the scope of this paper. To ensure concavity of the maximization problem, we need ∂LHS 3 ∂x 13 ≤ 0:
Proof of Lemma 5. The first-order condition associated with contestant i's optimization problem (where after derivation we have used x 11 = x 12 = x 1i ) is
This can be rearranged as (18).
It is straightforward to check that the second-order condition (obtained before using x 11 = x 12 ) holds.
Proof of Proposition 1. The concavity of the contestants' first-stage optimisation problem as shown in the proofs of Lemma 4 and 5 ensures the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium following arguments in Szidarovszky and Okuguchi (1997) .
Define the left-hand side of (A.4) as LHS(x 1i ):
Differentiating this yields
Since from Lemma 3 Π i3 (w 3 − x 13 ) ≥ v 4 , we get:
(A.7) − x 13 Π i3 (w 3 − x 13 )(16x 5 1i + 54x 4 1i x 13 + 67x 3 1i x 2 13 + 29x 2 1i x 3 13 + 9x 1i x 4 13 + x 5 13 ) 4x 2 1i (2x 1i + x 13 ) 3 (x 1i + x 13 ) 3
, and we can conclude that
< 0 (since x 1i > 0 and x 13 > 0).
Since LHS(x 1i ) is strictly decreasing and LHS(x * 1i ) = 0, it suffices to prove that LHS(x * 13 ) > 0.
From Lemma 3, we have both Π 3 (w 3 − x 13 ) < v 4 and Π 3 (w 3 − x 13 ) < Π i3 (w 3 − x 13 ). This implies:
Using the definition of LHS 3 we can write: (A.9)
Assume that x 13 > x 1i . This implies that the last bracket is positive and we get a contradiction (because LHS(x 1i ) = 0 = LHS 3 (x 13 )).
Proof of Proposition 2. The proof of Proposition 2 relies on a series of derivatives of LHS and
· Straightforward differentiation and simplification yield:
The last term is positive and since from Lemma 3 we have
(A.12) Since x 1i ≥ x 13 > 0, we can conclude that
Recall that from previous proofs, we also have > 0.).
Notice that for any equilibrium values (x 13 , x 23 ), we can write x 13 = αw 3 and x 23 = (1−α)w 3 for some α ∈ (0, 1). We can use this to write (A.10) as
Even if the value of α varies with w 3 , it always remains bounded within (0, 1). It is thus straightforward to conclude that
For small enough w 3 , the payoff effect becomes negligible and, using Proposition 2 we can conclude that lim w 3 →0
Proof of Corollary 2. Recall from the proof of Lemma 3 that for w 3 < w max
3
, we have Π 13 (x 23 ) < v 4 . Thus, we can obtain the following inequality from the first-order condition with respect to (A.20) In the limit when w 3 is close to w max
, it is easily checked that x 1i goes to x no 1 and the right-hand side of the above inequality goes to ) where x 1i > x no 1 . Since lim {w 3 →w max 3 } x 1i = x no 1 , this means that x 1i needs to be strictly decreasing on this interval. With continuity of x 1i , we can finally conclude that
) and thus the payoff effect dominates for large enough budgets.
Proof of Corollary 3. This is a direct consequence of Corollaries 1 and 2.
Proof of Lemma 6. When the budget-constrained contestant 3 makes it to the final, he is by assumption limited by his budget and following Che and Gale (1997) it is optimal for him to spend his entire budget. As in Lemmas 1 and 2 we get x 23 = w 3 − x 13 regardless of whether this contestant has a head start or not.
A finalist i with a head start facing the budget-constrained contestant chooses x h 2,i3 to maximize the following:
The first-order condition for this yields
Rearranging terms yields
A finalist i who does not have a head start (but is facing contestant 3 with a head start) chooses x nh 2,i3 to maximize the following:
The first-order condition for this yields Proof of Lemma 7. To establish the expected-payoff ranking for the contestant with a head start, we first notice that Π h 3 is increasing and Π h i3 is decreasing in the second-stage effort of contestant 3 (recall that x 23 = w 3 − x 13 ):
In the limit when the budget-constraint becomes irrelevant and contestant 3 can play his unconstrained optimal strategy, we get that Π h 3 and Π h i3 are equal to Π h ij :
However since this limit is excluded we obtain the first ranking in Lemma 7.
Similarly, in the case of the non-favored contestant, we show that Π nh 3 is increasing and Π nh i3 is decreasing in the second-stage effort of contestant 3:
In the limit when the budget-constraint becomes irrelevant and contestant 3 can play his unconstrained optimal strategy, we get that Π nh 3 and Π nh i3 are equal to Π h ij . This allows us to obtain the second ranking in Lemma 7.
Proof of Proposition 3. Before proving that x s * 1i > x s * 13 (where we, for simplicity, drop the superscript in the proof), we state the first-stage optimisation problems and the first-order conditions that characterize these equilibrium values. Notice also that the concavity of the optimisation problems ensures the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium (Szidarovszky and Okuguchi, 1997) .
At the first stage, the unconstrained contestants i ∈ {1, 2} face the following optimisation problem:
The associated first-order condition (when at equilibrium x 1i = x 1j ) is
All of the four coefficients in front of the expected second-stage payoffs can be shown to be positive.
Denote the left-hand side of (A.34) as F OC(x 1i ). To ensure concavity of the maximization problem we need
Differentiating F OC(x 1i ) yields:
Since from Lemma 7 we have Π h i3 > Π h ij and Π nh i3 ≥ Π nh ij , plus Π h ij > Π nh ij holds, we get: The associated first-order condition (when at equilibrium
where all the three last terms are negative.
Denote the left-hand side of (A.38) as F OC 3 (x 13 ). Differentiation and simplification yield:
Since Π h 3 > Π nh 3 and the two last terms are negative, the following holds:
So we can conclude that also the problem of the constrained contestant is concave.
From Lemma 7 we obtain the following inequality: Assume that x 1i < x 13 . This implies that the coefficient in front of Π h 3 is strictly positive Under this assumption, the coefficient in front of Π nh 3 is also strictly positive because This implies that F OC(x 1i ) > F OC 3 (x 13 ). However, for the optimal values of x 1i and x 13 these are both zero and we obtain our contradiction (0 > 0). Thus x s * 1i ≥ x s * 13 .
Proof of Proposition 4 . The proof of this proposition mirrors that of the proof of Proposition 2. We therefore only need to prove the sign of the following derivatives: √ v 4(w 3 − x 13 + h) 3/2 + 2x 1i x 13 (2x 1i + x 13 )(x 1i + x 13 ) √ v 4(w 3 − x 13 + h) 3/2 .
It is straightforward to check that the derivative of both of these expected payoffs is strictly positive. In addition the two last terms are strictly positive and we can conclude that ∂F OC 3 ∂w 3 > 0.
Finally, we also need to prove that > 0, it suffices to prove that X 1 + X 3 > 0.
X 1 + X 3 = 8x 4 1i + 4x 3 1i x 13 − 6x 2 1i x 2 13 − 5x 1i x 3 13 − x 4 13 (2x 1i + x 13 ) 3 (x 1i + x 13 ) 3 . (A.49) Since x 13 ≤ x 1i , this is positive.
Proof of Proposition 5. Notice that if the head start h is zero, then the first-order condition for the unconstrained player in the benchmark (equation (18)) and the first-order condition in the model with spillovers (equation (A.34) ) are the same.
If we can prove that h increases the marginal benefit (marginal cost is constant), then because of concavity of the problem we can conclude that the best-response function x 1i (x 13 ) shifts up as h increases (in particular the best-response with h is higher than without).
Recall that the first-order condition associated with the unconstrained contestant's problem in the spillover model is ∂h .
From Proposition 5, we know that in the relevant domain x 1i > x 13 . Thus if proving ∂Π nh i3 ∂h < 0, allows us to complete the proof and conclude that x 1i (x 13 ) = x h 1i (x 13 )| h=0 ≤ x h 1i (x 13 ) (where the last inequality is strict for h > 0). 
Proof of

